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Ford: Comparative Analysis of Drug Policy

FROM MOUNTAINS TO MOLEHILLS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
DRUG POLICY

BRIAN A. FORD

INTRODUCTION
I'm not exactly for the use of drugs -- don't get me wrong. But I
just believe that criminalizing marijuana, criminalizing the
possession of a few ounces of pot and that kind of thing, I mean,
it's costing us a fortune and it's ruining young people. Young
people go into prisons, they go in as youths, and the come out as
hardened criminals. And that's not a good thing.
Pat Robertson1
Many people never expected to hear the conservative pastor Pat
Robertson come out in support of decriminalizing marijuana or for
softening criminal sanctions on drugs in general. Addiction, crime, and
disease are harms that are commonly associated with drug use and the
drug trade - costs that are intangibly calculated in terms of human lives,
medical costs, lost productivity, and law enforcement costs. The need to
combat these harms has given broad support to an international effort by
governments and organizations, materialized in an international
1. The 700 Club, (CBN television broadcast Dec. 16, 2010), available at
www.cbn.com/media/player/index.aspx?s=/Archive/Club/700Club121610_WS. See also The 700
Club, (CBN television broadcast Mar. 1, 2012), available at www.cbn.com/media/
player/index.aspx?s=/archive/club/700Club030112_WS (reiterating his calls for decriminalization
Roberts states, “[i]t’s just shocking, especially this business about drug offenses. It’s time we stop
locking up people for possession of marijuana. We just can’t do it anymore.”).
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framework of prohibitionist drug policies, implemented through treaty
law and domestic law and enforced through military and police powers.
This prohibitionist effort is what has become known as the “war on
drugs,” and is politically supported by the image of politicians who are
“tough on crime.”
But Mr. Robertson is just one of many voices, some more unexpected
than others, adding to a chorus of people calling for change in the global
approach towards drug control efforts.2 These voices are looking at the
human costs of the war on drugs from the other end, the costs imposed
on people by law enforcement, and are wondering where the benefit to a
prohibitionist stance can be found. Among these voices are a growing
number of politicians, organizations, and governments. For decades,
some governments, like the Netherlands and Portugal, have been
utilizing harms reduction models of drug policy in place of strict
prohibition models.3 Even within the U.S., which leads the world in an
effort to prohibit and criminalize drugs, the calls for decriminalization
and legalization are growing.4

2. “Drug control” for the purposes of this paper is defined as the efforts of governments and
legal institutions to address harms associated with drug use, production, and trade. “Drug policy”
broadly refers to laws, regulations, and the behavior that governments and legal institutions can and
have adopted towards drug control. As will be presented in this paper, drug policy at present is
couched in a general policy of prohibition, whereby the use, production, and trade of drugs deemed
illicit is met with criminal sanction. This paper takes the position that there are other viable policy
options available and advocates the viability of these other options.
3. This paper divides drug policy options into three broad categories: (1) Prohibition; (2)
Harms Reduction; and (3) Legalization. “Prohibition” is a model of criminalization whereby the
substances deemed illicit and the people and organizations associated with their use, production, and
distribution are punished with criminal sanctions. “Harms reduction” refers to a policy that focuses
on the social and health problems associated with drugs, and seeks to treat these problems through
social and medical institutions rather than criminal justice systems and police forces. “Legalization”
removes criminal penalties associated with prohibition and in their place permits structures of
regulations applied to the use, production, and distribution of drugs.
The Netherlands passed the Dutch Opium Act in 1976, which deprioritized the prosecution
of laws prohibiting marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and other “soft drugs.” The effect of this
law is seen in the “coffee shop” culture of Amsterdam, whereby businesses selling marijuana and
other deprioritized drugs are permitted to operate free from fear of prosecution within certain
limitations. See Scientific Committee of the Netherlands Drug Monitor (NDM), Report to the
EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: The Netherlands Drug Situation 2011, 15-17 (2012),
available at www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index191640EN.html.
Portugal passed the National Action Plan for the Fight Against Drugs in 2001, which
decriminalized drug use. See European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2011
National Report (2010 data) to the EMCDDA by the Retoix National Focal Point, “Portugal”: New
Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues, 16-17 (2011), available at
www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index191616EN.html.
4. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Criminologists and Punitive Drug Prohibition: To Serve or to
Challenge?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 441, 443 (2003-2004) (noting that, “The United States
played a leadership role throughout much of the twentieth century in criminalizing opiates, cocaine,
marijuana, and hallucinogens, adopting such laws before most other countries and proselytizing
thereafter in favor of global prohibitions.” See also, Frank Newport, Record-High 50% of Americans
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Additionally, the United Nations (UN) and a number of Latin American
governments, like Colombia and Mexico, have become increasingly
weary of the international war on drugs, with its ever-increasing costs
and diminished to non-existent returns.5 In what many had hoped would
be a watershed moment, the governments of the American continents had
a formal discussion about the war on drugs and evidence-based
approaches to tackling the problem of drugs at the Summit of the
Americas in April of 2012.6 Because the possibility of legalization or a
Favor Legalizing Marijuana Use, Gallup Politics, Oct. 17, 2011, available at
www.gallup.com/poll/150149/record-high-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx (showing that
50% of Americans surveyed support the legalization of marijuana and 70% favor making it legal for
medicinal use).
See also Public Policy Polling, National Survey Results, Nov. 30-Dec. 2, 2012, available at
www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/blog/MPPResults.pdf (reporting that 58% of 1,325 registered American
voters sampled thought that marijuana should be legal).
See also Princeton Survey Research Associates International, Reason-Rupe Public Opinion
Survey:
January
2013
Topline
Results,
Jan.
31,
2013,
available
at
reason.com/assets/db/13627701016988.pdf (reporting that 47% of 1,000 adults interviewed in the
U.S. favor legalizing marijuana for recreational use and 53% think that the government should treat
marijuana the same as alcohol).
5. E.g., U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Political Declaration and Plan of Action
on International Cooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World
Drug
Problem,
52nd
Sess.
(2009)
p.46-47,
¶48
&
49,
available
at
www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Uploads/CND-52-RelatedFiles/V0984963English.pdf (expressing frustration with drug eradication efforts, the UNODC writes, “Despite some
significant progress made in certain areas, efforts have not led to a significant overall decrease in the
global illicit cultivation of crops used for the production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances. The lack of understanding of demand/supply drug market dynamics and the lack of a
long-term balanced approach, combined with ill-sequenced policy interventions, corruption and
inadequate international development assistance to address the causes driving illicit crop cultivation,
have impeded the ability Governments to sustain the gains achieved locally.”).
See also Ed Vulliamy, Colombia calls for global drugs taskforce, THE OBSERVER, (U.K.),
Apr. 14, 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/15/colombia-global-drugs-taskforce (reporting
that Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos “proposed the establishment of a taskforce of experts,
economists and academics to analyse the realities of global drug addiction, trafficking and
profiteering, with a view to a complete overhaul of strategy.”)
See also Juan Forero, Latin American countries pursue alternatives to U.S. drug war, THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
Apr.
10,
2012,
articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0410/world/35451300_1_latin-american-leaders-cartels-legalization (listing Colombian President Juan
Manuel Santos, Guatemalan President Otto Perez, then-Mexican President Felipe Calderonas,
former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria, former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, and former
Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso among the Latin American leaders most forcefully
offering new proposals and critiquing U.S. drug policy).
See also Adam Williams & Flavia Krause-Jackson, Costa Rica’s Chinchilla Calls for Drug
Legalization Debate, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 1, 2012, www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-01/costarica-calls-for-debate-on-drug-legalization-amid-record-trafficking.html (reporting Costa Rican
President Laura Chinchilla saying that “[d]rug legalization in Central America merits a 'serious’
debate as a solution to the crime and violence coursing through the region even if it runs up against
U.S. opposition.”).
6. E.g., Jamie Doward, ‘War on drugs’ has failed, say Latin American leaders, THE
OBSERVER (U.K.) 1 Apr. 7, 2012. The Summit of the Americas is a regional meeting of the heads of
state of nations in the Western hemisphere where regional policy issues are discussed and explored.
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broader harms reduction or legalization approach was skillfully avoided
by the U.S. at the summit, it seemed clear that, at least in the perspective
of the U.S. government, the war on drugs would continue to be a
foregone conclusion.7 However, international and domestic drug policy
debates in the U.S. and abroad were rekindled when Uruguay proposed
legalizing marijuana under a state-controlled monopoly, and Colorado
and Washington of the U.S. defied the federal laws of prohibition by
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana.8 Additionally, recent polls in
the U.S. indicate that somewhere around 50% of Americans are currently
in favor of legalizing and taxing marijuana instead of prohibiting it.9
These trends suggest the discussion of drug policy reform is occurring on
both domestic and international levels, and a real possibility exists that
major policy shifts will be experienced in the coming years.
This paper examines the debate surrounding the trend of global
movements away from prohibition and towards a harms reduction
approach to drug policy. This paper reviews the prohibitionist model that
is, by and large, the global status quo of how countries deal with drugs.
Under the prohibitionist approach, governments criminally ban the
production, trafficking, sale, possession, and use of drugs in an effort to
directly combat the harms associated with drugs. Section I of this paper
presents the prohibitionist approach as the international status quo and
7. See Forero, supra note 5 (quoting U.S. Vice President as saying “It’s worth discussing, but
there’s no possibility the Obama-Biden administration will change its policy on legalization.”).
See also Andrew Cawthorne and Pablo Gariban, UPDATE 3-Obama urged at summit to focus on
Latin America, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/13/americas-summitidUSL2E8FDG9D20120413 (reporting that despite “Latin American leaders clamoring for a new
approach to beat traffickers and reduce violence in the region” and many wanting to “start a
discussion on possible legalization measures to take the vast profits out of the [drug] trade,” Obama
opposed taking up that conversation at the summit.).
8. See Alan Duke, 2 states legalize pot, but don’t ‘break out the Cheetos’ yet, CNN, Nov. 8,
2012, www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/marijuana-legalization (reporting that Washington’s
measure I-502 and Colorado’s Amendment 64, both measures to legalize the recreational use of
marijuana in those states, had passed by popular vote on November 7, 2012). See also Tim Johnson,
Ex-world leaders: Time for U.S. to rethink drug policy as states ease marijuana laws, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 18, 2013, www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/08/3274866/ex-world-leaders-time-for-usto.html (reporting that Uruguayan President Jose Mujica announced a plan in June, 2012 to legalize
marijuana under a state monopoly. He later tabled the bill in December, 2012 to rethink the
approach.).
9. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 443 (noting that “The United States played a leadership
role throughout much of the twentieth century in criminalizing opiates, cocaine, marijuana, and
hallucinogens, adopting such laws before most other countries and proselytizing thereafter in favor
of global prohibitions.” See also Newport, supra note 4. See also Public Policy Polling, National
Survey Results, Nov. 30-Dec. 2, 2012, available at www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/blog/MPPResults.pdf
(reporting that 58% of 1,325 registered American voters sampled thought that marijuana should be
legal). See also Princeton Survey Research Associates International, Reason-Rupe Public Opinion
Survey:
January
2013
Topline
Results,
Jan.
31,
2013,
available
at
reason.com/assets/db/13627701016988.pdf (reporting that 47% of 1,000 adults interviewed in the
U.S. favor legalizing marijuana for recreational use and 53% think that the government should treat
marijuana the same as alcohol).
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examines the effects and failures of that approach. Section II examines a
variety of harms reduction approaches that attempt to address harms to
drug users and society at large through treatment, tolerance, and the
recognition of human rights. However, the potential successes of harms
reduction models are still constrained by the reality of prohibitionist legal
regimes whose stricter criminalization of drugs often contradict and
frustrate the policies and legislative efforts of harms reduction
proponents. Because the harms reduction approaches are restrained by a
prohibitionist legal regime that criminalizes their policies, legalization
becomes a necessary step to achieving the goals of harms reduction
approaches. Therefore, section III of this paper presents an alternative to
legal systems that ban drugs in order to remove this clash between
prohibitionist and harms reduction policies. Section III lays out three
arguments for the legalization of drugs on a global scale. This paper
concludes that a legalization-based approach is the best drug policy. It
advocates that governing bodies all over the world adopt an intelligent,
legalized approach to the problem of drugs in society as a more effective
approach to combating the harms of drug addiction and the crimes of the
drug trade while upholding human rights, global equity, and rule of law.
I.

THE PROHIBITION MODEL

The U.S. and most of the world utilize a prohibition model of drug
control.10 The prohibition model is characterized by the use of legal
sanctions and criminal penalties for the possession, production,
trafficking, and sale of drugs deemed illicit by international bodies and
domestic scheduling systems.11 The possible penalties include
imprisonment, fines, or a sentence of death. Further, the prohibition
model is implemented on a near-universal global scale by three
international treaties: (1) the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
(SCND) of 1961; (2) the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (CPS)

10. The international treaty law governing the current global approach to drug control enjoys
near universal acceptance. Of the 193 member states to the United Nations, there are 184 states party
to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, 183 states party to Convention on Psychotropic
Substances of 1971, and 185 states party to Convention Against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs
of 1988. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 18 U.S.T. 1407 (1961) [hereinafter “SCND”],
Convention on Psychotropic Substances 32 U.S.T. 543 (1971) [hereinafter “CPS”], United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 28 I.L.M.493
(1988) [hereinafter “CAIT”]. These treaties and more specifics on them can be found at
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html?ref=menutop [hereinafter “the treaties”].
11. International and national governing bodies determine which drugs are “illegal” by
categorizing harmful or addictive drugs into different “schedules,” or categories. Different drugs are
treated differently based on what category the drugs are in. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) and § 812
(2013). See also the treaties, supra note 10.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013

5

108

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 19 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 10

202

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX

of 1971; and the Convention Against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (CAIT) of 1988.12
This section of the paper focuses on the prohibition model employed
internationally and by the U.S. The first part of this section outlines the
three main treaties governing drug control internationally. The second
part of this section looks at U.S. prohibition policies domestically. The
third part of this section examines the U.S. prohibition approach
internationally. While prohibition has been implemented by governments
across the globe through the three treaties as one of the most accepted
norms of international law, the effort to prohibit drugs was, and
continues to be, spearheaded and largely funded by the U.S.13 Therefore,
U.S. drug policy serves as a good model for prohibition in a domestic
context. Specifically, this section presents Mexico and Colombia as
representative focal points of the U.S.’ efforts in the international war on
drugs.
A.

THE THREE MAIN TREATIES

In the name of “the health and welfare of mankind,” the UN, through the
Economic and Social Council, has legislated an international war on
drugs to combat the evil of addiction to narcotic drugs.14 While there was
international consensus on the need to combat the illicit use of drugs,
most nations recognized that narcotic drugs are “indispensable for the
medical use of pain relief.”15 Therefore, the UN adopted a comprehensive
strategy for the control of narcotic drugs, requiring member States to
coercively prevent the illegal production, trafficking, and consumption of
specified narcotic substances.16 This comprehensive strategy is
implemented by the ascension of member States to three treaties: the
SCND, the CPS, and the CAIT.17

12. The treaties, supra note 10, are available at UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC),
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html?ref=menutop.
13. See UNODC Annual Report 2010 at 16, 64, & 67 (reporting that in 2009, more than 88%
of the total UNODC budget came from voluntary donations of member states, with the U.S.
contributing roughly 5% of those donations. This is but a small portion of the over-all expenditure of
the U.S. in fighting the war on drugs), available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/annualreport.html?ref=menutop. See also Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 443 (noting that, “The United States
played a leadership role throughout much of the twentieth century in criminalizing opiates, cocaine,
marijuana, and hallucinogens, adopting such laws before most other countries and proselytizing
thereafter in favor of global prohibitions.”).
14. SCND, supra note 10, Preamble.
15. Id.
16. Daniel Heilmann, The International Control of Illegal Drugs and the U.N. Treaty Regime:
Preventing or Causing Human Rights Violations?, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237, 239
(2011).
17. The treaties, supra note 10.
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The treaties have received near-universal acceptance, with almost every
State in the world being a party to at least one.18 To date, of the 193
member States to the UN, there are 184 States party to SCND, 183 States
party to CPS, and 185 States party to CAIT.19 Because of the way that the
treaties were created and adopted, the international community has
divided the illicit drug market into two broad categories: Narcotics and
Psychotropics. The SCND framed the international community’s general
approach toward a global prohibition of drugs, but as new substances
with similar effects began emerging, the international community
expanded this prohibition under the CPS and implemented mandatory
criminalization with the CAIT. This portion of the paper presents the
history of this international prohibitionist regime.
As the foundational instrument of the current international prohibitionist
legal regime, the SCND defined and scheduled “narcotics,” resulting in
prohibitive measures against heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. The SCND
created four schedules of narcotic drugs, classifying over one hundred
illicit substances according to how addictive they were perceived to be.20
Under this scheme of schedules, heroin, cocaine, and cannabis were
deemed to pose the greatest threat and were listed in Schedule I,
subjecting them to all controls under the convention, whereas less
stringent controls were placed on substances in the other schedules.21
SCND designates the scheduling of substances to the World Health
Organization (WHO), with the approval of the UN Commission on
Narcotic Drugs (UNCND).22
The main strategy behind SCND was a supply-side approach to
eliminating the international drug trade. The treaty attacked the supplyside of the drug trade by imposing state-controlled monopolies on the
production of narcotic drugs so that trade with other nations was only
allowed through a group of licensed agencies, strictly monitored by
international bodies.23 Producing nations were directed to take
appropriate measures to destroy crops of raw narcotics (opium poppies,
coca bush, and cannabis plants) if the crops were grown outside the aegis
of the member States’ estimates of production necessary to meet global

18. Id.
19. UNODC, supra note 5.
20. Heilmann, supra note 16, at 244.
21. SCND, supra note 10, at art. 2. Schedule II contains substances typically administered
medically, Schedule III substances are generally available pharmaceutically, and Schedule IV
substances are permitted in small amounts for medical and scientific research.
22. Id. at art. 3. The CND is a part of the UN Economic and Social Council, and can be
understood as the political counterpart to WHO in the scheduling of substances under SCND.
23. Id. at art. 3, 23, 26, 29, 30, and 31.
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medicinal and scientific needs.24 The adoption of the SCND represented
the first substantial codification of the international war on drugs.
As time passed, however, the international community found the need to
expand the scope of international drug controls beyond narcotic drugs to
synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances manufactured chemically,
because they were not contemplated by the SCND.25 Therefore, the
UNCND drafted the CPS, which was largely modeled on the SCND and
was quickly adopted by the international community. Under the CPS, a
“psychotropic substance” was defined broadly as any substance that “has
the capacity to produce: 1) A state of dependence, and 2) Central nervous
system stimulation or depression resulting in hallucinations or
disturbances in motor function or thinking or behavior or perception or
mood,” or similar abuse and ill effects as a previously scheduled
substance.26 Additionally, the WHO is given wide discretion to
recommend a substance for assessment and scheduling if “there is
sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so
as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing
of the substance under international control.”27 Any substance scheduled
under the CPS is subject to a similarly strict scheme of internationally
supervised and licensed agencies as required under the SCND.28
The result of the SCND and the CPS together is a sweeping prohibition
of the production of a broad spectrum of drugs for any purpose other
than medical use and medical or scientific research.29 Additionally, each
treaty requires that possession of controlled substances be prohibited and
requires member States to adopt penal provisions to enforce the treaties
domestically.30 However, as time passed, it was found that illegal
production and trafficking of drugs was increasing, and global drug
abuse continued to spike out of control, contrary to the efforts of the
international community.31 In response, the UN General Assembly

24. Id. at art. 22 and 26.
25. Heilmann, supra note 16 at 246. Notably, although synthetic drugs and chemically
produced psychotropics had existed prior to the adoption of the SCND, their production and use
increased greatly after the adoption of the SCND created a general prohibition on other illicit
substances.
26. CPS, supra note 10, at art. 2.
27. Id. art. 2.
28. Id. at art. 5, 8, 9, and 10. See also Heilmann, supra note 16 at 247-248.
29. SCND, supra note 10, art. 4 and 33. See also CPS, supra note 10, art. 5 and 22.
30. SCND, supra note 10, art. 33. See also CPS, supra note 10, art. 22.
31. Heilmann, supra note 16, at 248-249.
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recommended that the UNCND prepare a draft convention against illicit
drug trafficking, and within 3 years, the UNCND produced the CAIT.32
CAIT acts as an extension to the SCND and CPS by reinforcing the
controls that the earlier treaties laid down and requiring member States to
impose criminal sanctions on all stages of the illegal drug market.33
Crimes specifically enumerated by the CAIT are the possession,
purchase, or cultivation of drugs for personal consumption, and the CAIT
proscribes “imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty,
pecuniary sanctions and confiscation” as appropriate punishment for
those offenses.34 CAIT also improved the co-operation of law
enforcement agencies internationally and included provisions enhancing
the confiscation of drug proceeds, extradition of drug offenders,
international legal assistance, and police training.35
These three treaties taken together constitute the main pillars of the
current international war on drugs. While there are provisions in both the
SCND and CPS for the existence of legal domestic drug markets for
limited purposes, the treaties are correctly read to criminally prohibit all
production, traffic and sale of illicit drugs for anything other than
scientific and medical purposes.36 This prohibitionist stance was largely
focused on supply-side controls in production and demand-side
criminalization of consumption and was reiterated at the 1998 UN
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Political Declaration.37
UNGASS targeted 2008 as a benchmark year for measurable results in
the war on drugs.38 In 2008, however, both global drug production and
trafficking were still relatively stable, there was little discernible change
in drug abuse worldwide, and levels of violence and lawlessness were
increasing dramatically in multiple nation States.39 Thus, the international
community found itself changing direction in a renewed Political
Declaration and Plan of Action in 2009 (Plan of Action).40

32. Id. at 249.
33. CAIT, supra note 10, art. 3.
34. Id. at art. 3. Article 3 also provides for measures that a state may impose in addition to
criminal sanctions, such as treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation, or social reintegration.
35. Id. at art. 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10.
36. SCND, supra note 10, art. 4, 21, 23, 26, and 28, SCND. See also CPS, supra note 10, art.
5. See also CAIT, supra note 10, art. 3.
37. Heilmann, supra note 16, at 252.
38. Id.
39. U.N. Declaration, supra note 5, at 10-13, ¶12, 27, & 29. See also Heilmann, supra note 16,
at 252.
40. U.N. Declaration, supra note 5, at 10-13, ¶12, 27, & 29. See also Heilmann, supra note 16,
at 252.
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The Plan of Action calls for member States to “[reduce] drug abuse and
dependence through a comprehensive approach” with a focus on
education and treatment based programs in addition to the prohibitionist
approach to the illicit production and marketing of drugs for
consumption.41 Also, the Plan of Action initiated a shift from traditional
crop eradication and destruction strategies to a call for “innovative
strategies to support alternative development.”42 While the Plan of Action
recognizes that there is currently “an insufficient emphasis on human
rights and dignity in the context of drug demand reduction efforts,” there
is no mention of the protection of human rights in the process of supplyside drug interdiction efforts other than reducing levels of corruption and
violence perpetrated by criminal organizations.43
The effect that these policy shifts will have on the international war on
drugs remains unclear. The law behind the global prohibition of drugs
remains intact in the three main treaties, and the main thrust of
enforcement remains centered on traditional eradication and interdiction
efforts, including the domestic criminalization of illicit drug use and
production. These policy shifts have, however, altered the on-the-ground
efforts of certain international agencies in addressing the global drug
problem and can be understood to some extent to represent a turn
towards harms reduction approaches, which will be discussed in section
II of this paper.
B.

DOMESTIC PROHIBITION IN THE U.S.

The drug policy employed by the U.S. is prohibition. The policy of drug
prohibition operates on simple economic theory, while the motivation of
prohibition is moral.44 The economic theory of prohibition contends that
in any given market, if the price of production is increased, then the price
of the good will increase and the demand will fall.45 The moral argument
is that the ends justify the means; the eradication of the social costs
associated with the illicit drug market is worth the price paid in terms of
people incarcerated and the money spent on law enforcement, courts, and

41. U.N. Declaration, supra note 5, at 19-20, ¶4.
42. Id. at 46-47, ¶48 & 49.
43. Id. at p. 31-33, ¶25 & 29.
44. A fuller discussion of the economics of the illegal drug market is presented in the first part
of section IV of this paper.
45. See generally Eva Bertram and Bill Spencer, Democratic Dilemmas in the U.S. War on
Drugs in Latin America. INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY (ISD), (2000). Gary S Becker,
Kevin M. Murphy, Michael Grossman, The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs 114
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (2006). Michael L. Ross, What Do We Know about Natural
Resources and Civil War? 41-3 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 337-56 (2004).
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prisons. This portion of the paper presents the policy of prohibition in the
U.S. and some of the costs of its operation.
The modern approach of drug control in the U.S. was launched by the
Control Substances Act (CSA) of 1970 under President Richard Nixon as
a means of implementing the U.S.’ treaty obligations as a signatory to the
SCND and CPS.46 The CSA, in fulfillment of treaty obligations, created
and implemented a drug schedule similar to that created internationally
by the SCND.47 In 1973, President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) to implement and enforce the provisions of this act.48
This anti-drug policy of the U.S. was later intensified in the 1980s under
President Ronald Reagan with the introduction of a series of laws that
implemented mandatory minimum federal sentencing for drug law
violations.49 These sentencing laws ensured criminal sanctions of
imprisonment for all drug offenses, including marijuana offenses and
mere possession of illicit substances.50 Additionally, the severity of the
sentences that these laws required increased the length of incarceration
for drug offenses.51 Combined, these policy choices have spawned a
perfect storm of social harm and institutional harm, as detailed below.
The impacts of drugs and the war on drugs in the U.S. are best described
in terms of dollars and arrests. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates
that the annual economic impact of illicit drugs on the U.S. is
approximately $215 billion, considering an overburdened justice system,
a strained healthcare system, lost productivity, and environmental
destruction.52 In 2012, the U.S. federal government allotted $26.2 billion

46. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(7) (2013) (referring to the treaty obligations of the U.S.). The
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 was codified into law under §801. See also 21 U.S.C. §§
801(a)(2)-(3) (2013) (referring to the treaty obligations imposed on the U.S. under the CPS).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) and § 812.
48. Exec. Order No. 11,727, 3 C.F.R. 785 (1971-1975).
49. See generally Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, Oct. 12, 1984,
98 Stat. 1976. This series of laws made marijuana offenses a violation of federal law and
implemented policies of federal incarceration for drug offenders. See also generally Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), Pub.L. 99-570, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207. This series of laws
generated mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for a wide range of drug offenses, including a
notably disparate treatment of crack cocaine offenses as compared to powder cocaine offenses. The
disparity in cocaine offenses was reduced by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the
disparity in sentencing between crack and powdered cocaine to a ration of 18:1 (See, 21 U.S.C. §§
841).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) and § 812.
51. Id.
52. U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, 1, available at
www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf [hereinafter
“Drug Threat Assessment”].
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to fight the war on drugs.53 Similarly, in 2011, the U.S. spent $10 billion
on eradication programs and $9 billion on drug-related law enforcement
domestically.54 Clearly, the cost of prohibition at home is steep.
Meanwhile, the focus of U.S. police forces on drug crime is reflected in
the number of people arrested and incarcerated for drug law violations.
Drug violations constitute the most common category for arrests and
have accounted for two thirds of the increase in the federal prison
population.55 To date, at least 20 million Americans have been arrested
for the possession of marijuana since the Nixon-era prohibition went into
effect in 1970.56 There were 1,702,537 men and women arrested for drug
violations in 2008 alone.57
Contemporaneous with the policies implemented by Presidents Nixon
and Reagan, the total amount of people incarcerated in the U.S. increased
from roughly 330,000 in 1970 to approximately 2 million in the year
2000, with the national per-capita incarceration rate increasing well
above 400% over the same time-span.58 While many states and localities
throughout the nation have recently reduced the criminal penalties
associated with mere possession offenses, a violation of the federal drug
laws in the U.S. still results in severe penalties.59 Arrests for drug
violations totaled about 14 million in 2008 or 12.2% of all arrests made
in the U.S.60 That figure represents an increase of nearly 65% in the
proportion of drug arrests over the last two decades.61 While there were

53. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Budget - FY 2012 Funding
Highlights, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/fy12highlight_exec_
sum.pdf, accessed November 2011 [hereinafter “National Drug Control Budget”].
54. Id. See also Gil Kerlikowske, What We Have to Say About Legalizing Marijuana: Official
White House Response to “Legalize and Regulate Marijuana in a Manner Similar to Alcohol and 7
other petitions,” wwws.whitehouse.gov/petition-tool/response/what-we-have-say-about-legalizingmarijuana? utm_source=wethepeople&utm_medium=response&utm_campaign=ondcp, accessed
November 2011 [hereinafter “Official White House Response to Legalization”].
55. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 60 (2010).
56. Drug Threat Assessment, supra note 52, at 5 (citing annual data from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI)).
57. Id.
58. See Justice Policy Institute, The Punishing Decade: Prison and Jail Estimates at the
Millennium, Justice Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. (May 2000), available at
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/punishing_decade.pdf (showing the number
of prison and jail inmates as 338,029 in 1970, 474,368 in 1980, 1,148,70 in 1990, and 1,965,667 in
2000. Also placing the U.S. incarceration rate at 166.3 in 1970, 209.39 in 1980, 461 in 1990, and
691 in 2000).
59. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841.
60. Drug Threat Assessment, supra note 52, at 5 (citing annual data from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
61. Id. at 5 (citing that in 1987, drug violations made up 7.4% of all arrests in the U.S.).
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50,000 people incarcerated for drug violations in 1980, the number had
risen to approximately 500,000 in 2010.62
Additionally, the prohibition policies have dramatically increased the
percentage of people in prison. Nearly 20% of state prisoners and 53% of
federal prisoners in the U.S. are incarcerated for a drug offense.63
Partially because of the effort to combat drugs with prohibition in the
U.S., American prisons incarcerate roughly 23% of the world prison
population, raising human rights concerns within the U.S. and
international human rights organizations.64 Further, the effect of a
criminal record containing a drug offense in the U.S. is devastating to the
individual. An arrest record can lead to permanent problems such as
finding employment, housing, financing for college, or admission to
college.65 In fact, a criminal drug conviction can result in ineligibility for
any federal assistance.66 Based on these facts, the single largest issue of
criminal law in the U.S., in terms of both resources spent and impact on
society, is criminal drug law.
As a result of prohibitionist drug policy, the bulk of U.S. law
enforcement is geared towards drug related crime. While many
prohibitionists view the social costs of mass incarcerations as a necessary
evil to reduce drug use and the crime associated with it, decades of
experience indicate that drug use under prohibitionist policies remains
relatively constant. The prohibitionist model actually elevates crime rates
and the costs of law enforcement needed to stamp down the persistent
illegal drug trade. These law enforcement costs include the money and
officers devoted to detection, interdiction, prosecution, imprisonment,
and rehabilitation of offenders.
C.

U.S. PROHIBITION ABROAD

In addition to the effects of prohibition felt within the U.S., the
international war on drugs has also created more severe problems abroad.
62. Stephen B. Duke, Cannabis Captiva: Freeing the World from Marijuana Prohibition, 11
GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 83, 86 (2010-2011).
63. Drug Threat Assessment, supra note 52, at 5 (citing data from the United States Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
64. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST, SCHOOL OF LAW, KING’S COLLEGE
LONDON, (8th ed. 2009), available at www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf
(noting that the U.S. is in the company of Iran and China). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2013 642-645 (2013) (noting the incredibly high incarceration rates, issues of rape
in prisons, overcrowding, racial disparities, and a Supreme Court ruling in 2011 ordering the state of
California to reduce its prison population due to inadequate medical and mental health care for
inmates) (See Brown v. Plata 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011)).
65. Duke, supra note 62, at 86.
66. Id.
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The U.S., a leader in the international war on drugs, as well as an
influential world power, took the lead in supporting and conducting
counter drug efforts in multiple countries. This section focuses on U.S.'
efforts in Colombia under Plan Colombia and efforts in Mexico under
the Mérida Initiative. Plan Colombia was launched in 1998 as a joint
effort between U.S. President Clinton (and later, by President Bush) and
Colombian President Pastrana (and later Presidents Uribe and Santos).67
The Mérida Initiative was created in 2007 under U.S. President Bush
(and expanded by President Obama) and Mexican President Calderón.68
1.

U.S. Policy in Colombia and Plan Colombia

In addition to prohibitionist efforts at home, the U.S. has made strong
efforts abroad to fight the war on drugs by halting the production of
drugs in other countries. Perhaps the clearest example of this policy is
the anti-drug efforts of the U.S. under Plan Colombia. This portion of the
paper presents Plan Colombia and its effects.
Plan Colombia was an effort to eradicate the coca crops in Colombia.
These coca crops supply the world with 60% of its cocaine, and 90% of
the cocaine consumed by individuals in the U.S. Over a span of less than
10 years, the U.S. spent $4.7 billion on the Plan. Up to 75% of that figure
(approximately $3.5 billion) went directly to Colombian police and
military forces. Despite these efforts, the U.S. State Department reported
that attempted coca production in Colombia rose 36% between 2000 and
2008.69 Further, the focus of Plan Colombia eventually became aerial
eradication, the airborne fumigation of coca crops with poisonous
chemicals.70 The fumigation of these crops yielded a reduction in coca
production of 0.001%, while indiscriminately destroying farmlands and
water sources of the poorer farming class.71 The fumigations efforts
resulted in the physical displacement of more than 281,000 people
between the years of 2000 and 2005.72 Nevertheless, the U.S. continues
to finance Colombia’s drug interdiction efforts heavily under the newly

67. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, United States Support for Colombia: Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs (March 28, 2000), available at www.state.gov/www/regions/
wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html.
68. Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-International Armed Conflict
Classification, 34 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1042, 1073 (2011).
69. Michelle L. Dion & Catherine Russler, Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and
Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia. 40-3 J. LAT. AM. STUD.
399, 400 (2008).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 403.
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named Andean Initiative, contributing $673 million in 2010 and $482
million in 2012, for mostly military and police aid.73
Like the U.S., Colombia has a strict approach to the criminalization of
drugs. Possession, use, or trafficking in Colombia all constitute criminal
offenses, punishable with long prison sentences in extremely harsh
conditions.74 Even after release from prison, Colombian law requires
serious offenders to serve a lengthy parole, sometimes more than a year,
preventing the offender from leaving the country.75 Additionally, drug
laws are strictly enforced, and Colombian police are well trained and
equipped for drug detection and interdiction.76
Paramilitary groups and the Colombian government’s efforts to control
those groups remain a major problem in Colombia. In the 1960s, a
revolutionary group dubbed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC)
came to prominence in Colombia and at one point controlled more than
40% of the Colombian territory.77 In response to FARC and the
Colombian government’s inability to contain them, several paramilitary
groups formed, including the United Self-Defense of Colombia (AUC),
the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and a more recently formed
organization known as Minga.78 Additionally, all of these groups were
known to engage in mass human rights violations, including massacres,
killings, and rapes.79 The ELN in particular was notorious for kidnapping
politicians and holding them for ransom prior to signing a peace
agreement being integrated into the current political system as a party.80
The conflict between these groups and the Colombian government was
fueled by money from the illegal drug trade.81 The amount of money
funneling into Colombia through the illegal drug trade was estimated by

73. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011, 231 (2011) and HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013, 220 (2013).
74. United States Department of State, Colombia: Country Specific Information,
travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1090.html#criminal_penalties (April 2012) [hereinafter
“State Department: Colombia”].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS, UNITED STATES:
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 79 (2002). See also, SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN, LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD 298 (16th ed. 2007).
78. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 77, and SOUTH
AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 77.
79. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 77, and SOUTH
AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 77.
80. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 77, and SOUTH
AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 77.
81. See Ross, supra note 45, at 344-46. See also Dion & Russler, supra note 69, at 400.
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one government study to be $1 billion per year between 1982 and 1998.82
Other studies put this figure between $1.5 billion and $2.5 billion per
year.83 The sheer amount of money involved is compounded by the low
cost of producing drugs, meaning that the return on investment in illegal
drugs is immense. It is estimated that the disparity between production
costs and profit are so great that the average drug organization could lose
70-80% of its product to anti-drug efforts and still be a profitable
enterprise.84
While Plan Colombia and increased military efforts by the Colombian
government were eventually somewhat successful in combatting FARC,
paramilitary groups continue to engage in drug trafficking and to commit
abuses on the public including massacres, killings, rapes, and forced
displacement.85 Additionally, the drug trade has a tendency to corrupt the
governments in producing nations.86 Billions of dollars of drug money
goes to government officials in the form of bribes.87 Some progress has
been made in the investigation of Colombian congress members with
suspected ties to paramilitaries, resulting in over 150 congress members
investigated and 20 convicted.88 However, instead of curbing violence
and undercutting the production of drugs in Colombia, the “successes” of
Plan Colombia have more clearly pushed violence and criminality across
borders into other Latin American nations. This shift in violence is seen
in Mexico, which received a large portion of the drug trade when Plan
Colombia made trafficking difficult in Colombia. These themes are
explored in more detail in the next portion of this section.
2.

U.S. Policy in Mexico and the Mérida Initiative

Mexico is among the nations suffering from the violence pushed from
Colombia by militant anti-drug efforts under Plan Colombia. Mexico, at
present, is arguably facing the ugliest aspects of the illegal drug trade and
the greatest threats to the rule of law. In order to assist in re-establishing
the rule of law under the Mexican government, the U.S. has intervened
with the Mérida Initiative. This portion of the paper examines the Mérida
Initiative and its effects in Mexico.
82. SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, LONDON: EUROPA
PUBLICATIONS LTD 298 (16th ed. 2007).
83. Id.
84. Bertram & Spencer, supra note 45, at 7.
85. HRW WORLD REPORT 2011, supra note 73, at 228.
86. See Dion & Russler, supra note 69, at 411.
87. Id.
88. HRW WORLD REPORT 2011, supra note 73, at 228 (see also p. 229, noting that “The
Supreme Court is currently investigating more than 20 members of Congress amid concerns of high
levels of paramilitary infiltration”).
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Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have existed since the
earliest formations of international drug policy, but since the early 1990s,
when Plan Colombia was implemented, they have become increasingly
stronger, better organized, more influential, and more militant.89
Additionally, beginning with Mexican President Zedillo Ponce de Léon
in the 1990s and continuing to the present, and with strong support from
the U.S., the Mexican government has increasingly militarized its efforts
to combat DTOs.90 The situation has worsened as Mexican DTOs
continue to expand in North American drug markets, making the illicit
drug trade in Mexico worth tens of billions of dollars per year and
fueling competition between Mexican DTOs over markets and
trafficking routes.91
In 2007, U.S. President Bush joined with President Calderón to form the
Mérida Initiative, which was modeled on Plan Colombia’s militant antidrug approach.92 Through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. Department of
State has contributed over $1.5 billion to Mexico’s war on drugs, with
most of the money being devoted solely to federal programs and
agencies.93 With the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. Department of State has
placed two experienced federal prosecutors and a forensics expert in
Mexico to assist in the strengthening and developing of law enforcement
task forces and restoring the internal integrity of Mexican law
89. See Bergal, supra note 68, at 1085 (noting that Mexican drug cartels gained notoriety
through violence since the downfall of Colombia’s Cali and Medelín cartels in the 1990s).
90. Jeremiah E. Goulka, A New Strategy for Human Rights Protection: Learning from
Narcotics Trafficking in Mexico, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L., 231, 246-47 (2001) (“Perhaps in
response to international pressure, Zedillo declared drug trafficking, and the corruption it fosters
within the government to be Mexico’s principal national security threat … ”). See also Holly
Buchanan, Fleeing the Drug War Next Door: Drug-related Violence as a Basis for Refugee
Protection for Mexican Asylum-Seekers, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 28, 29 (2011)
(reporting that Mexican President Calderón launched an unprecedented crackdown on drug
trafficking organizations, deploying over 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police since 2006 to
combat DTOs). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 261 (2011) (noting that the
United States has allocated $1.5 billion in aid to Mexico through the 2007 Merída Initiative).
91. Drug Threat Assessment, supra note 52, at 2, 9 (noting that Mexican DTOs constitute the
greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States and that Mexican DTOs have expanded
operations into every region of the United States, especially into areas where influence of Colombian
DTOs are diminishing). See also UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2011, 35 (2011) (noting that
North America remains the world’s largest drug market and that trafficking of drugs remains
primarily directed towards North America, with cannabis, methamphetamine, and cocaine primarily
being trafficked through Mexico to the United States), available at www.unodc.org/documents/dataand-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf [hereinafter “World Drug Report”].
See also Buchanan, supra note 90, at 30 (noting that drug trafficking from South America to the US
by Mexican DTOs is a business with an estimated value of $13 billion per year).
92. See Bergal, supra note 68, at 1085.
93. Id. See also U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, The Merida Initiative: Fact Sheet, Bureau of
International
Narcotics
and
Law
Enforcement
Affairs,
June
23,
2009,
www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/122397.htm, last accessed Nov. 2011 [hereinafter “Merida Initiative Fact
Sheet”]. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 261 (2011).
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enforcement and prosecutorial offices.94 Nonetheless, a 2007 National
Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) study shows that Mexican DTOs had
received at least $17.2 billion solely from smuggled bulk cash shipments
in 2003 alone.95
Over the past few decades Mexico has suffered more carnage as a result
of the international war on drugs than any other nation. Mexico has
suffered the loss of between 23,000 and 43,000 lives in drug-related
murders since 2006, with between 200 and 300 individuals being killed
per week in turf wars between DTOs and the Mexican government’s
forces.96 The uncertain quantity of murders in Mexico, as well as a lack
of data related to civilian deaths, has been criticized by human rights
groups as detrimental to the “common good.”97 The deaths are indicative
of a larger problem of both accountability and transparency in Mexican
institutions.98
The Mexican government has deployed as many as 45,000 soldiers and
5,000 federal police agents within its borders to counter DTOs.99 In 2010,
allegations of abuse at the hands of Mexican authorities numbered in the
thousands, including arbitrary and unlawful killings, torture, rape,
disappearances, and prisoner abuse.100 Many of these allegations go
unanswered. Further complicating matters are extreme levels of
corruption and collusion in the government with DTOs, who are

94. See, Bergal, supra note 68, at 1085.
95. Drug Threat Assessment, supra note 52, at 47.
96. See Justice in Mexico Project, August 2010 News Report, August 2010,
www.justiceinmexico.org (noting that official numbers from the Mexican government vary, ranging
from 24,000-28,000 killed since 2006) [hereafter “Mexico Justice Report”]. See also Buchanan,
supra note 90, at 29 (placing the number of deaths at, “Nearly 23,000 people [since 2006]”). See
also Bergal, supra note 68, at 1044 (putting the death-toll at approximately 30,000 from 2006-2010).
See also David Luhnow, Just an Ordinary Day of Death in Mexico’s War on Drug Traffickers, Wall
Street
Journal,
August
27,
2011,
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904787
404576528413479614524.html (reporting “In the last four years, roughly 43,000 people have been
killed in Mexico in drug-related killings”). See also U.S. Department of State, Mexico: Country
Specific
Information,
travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_970.html#criminal_penalties,
(November 2011) (reporting that, “[a]ccording to Government of Mexico figures, 34,612 people
have been killed in narcotics-related violence since December 2006”) [hereafter referred to as “State
Department: Mexico”].
97. Mexico Justice Report, supra note 96, at 10-11.
98. Id. at 10-11.
99. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MEXICO, REPORT: MEXICO, 2010
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160469.pdf.
100. Id. at 10. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 256 (2011) (reporting that
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission received more than 1,100 human rights complaints in
the first six months of 2010).
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estimated to pay up to 60% of their $13-48 billion dollar annual profits in
bribes to Mexican authorities.101
In Mexico, possession, use, or trafficking of illegal drugs are all criminal
offenses that are punishable with long jail sentences and heavy fines.102
Prison conditions are considered extremely poor. Further, jail sentences
for drug offenses can be up to 25 years.103 The Mexican prison population
has grown by more than 90,000 inmates since 1998, with as many as
42% not being tried in court for their crimes.104 Recently, however,
Mexico has instituted new laws excusing the possession of small
amounts of drugs for personal use or first time offenders, in an effort to
shift its focus from prosecuting consumption to suppressing ongoing
violence.105 While these provisions do alter the criminal focus of drug
prohibition in Mexico, they also reinforce a prohibitionist stance because
the government has increased prison terms for the sale of drugs, which
now can be up to eight years.106 Further, these penalties are doubled when
they occur within 300 feet of educational, police, or detention centers, or
if the crime is committed by police, judicial, or health professionals.107
As devastating as the prohibitionist policies of the U.S. have been on its
own populace, the human costs weigh much more heavily on her
neighbors to the South. The prohibitionist model results in an expensive
war on drugs, paid for with both dollars and human lives. Still,
prohibitionists, who continue to control the political sphere in the U.S.,
argue that these costs are necessary to suppress demand in the U.S. and
that decriminalization and legalization both would only compound the
current situation. However, the evidence suggests that demand for drugs
would not go up if the government applied decriminalization or
legalization policies instead of the prohibition model. These contrary

101. See Goulka, supra note 90. See also Colleen Cook, CRS Report for Congress: Mexico’s
Drug Cartels, 4 (October 2007) (reporting that Mexican DTO annual sales are estimated to range
from $13.6-48.4 billion annually). This figure has likely increased as Mexican DTOs have expanded
greatly into American markets as Colombian DTOs have withdrawn in recent years. See Drug Threat
Assessment, supra note 52, at 2, 9.
102. State Department: Mexico, supra note 96.
103. Id.
104. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 99, at 13 (citing the King’s College World Prison Brief,
supra note 64).
105. State Department: Mexico, supra note 96. See also Embassy of Mexico, Reforms to the
General Health Act, the Federal Penal Code, and the Federal Code of Criminal Procedures, 1
(August 2009) (allows for possession of up to 2 grams of opium, 50 milligrams of heroin, 5 grams of
marijuana, 500 milligrams of cocaine, .015 milligrams of LSD, 40 milligrams of MDMA, or 40
milligrams of methamphetamine for personal use).
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 2.
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arguments are presented in the following sections, beginning with
established harms reduction models.
II.

THE HARMS REDUCTION MODELS

Despite the near-universal acceptance of the global prohibition of drugs,
even from the signing of SCND in 1961, some nations have followed a
model of harms reduction instead. Harms reduction, instead of strictly
prohibiting drugs, focuses on reducing the impact of drug-related harms
on society. Specifically, harms reduction approaches address the problem
of drug addiction as a public health issue rather than a public safety or
law enforcement issue, and seeks to address drug addiction as a social
problem. Responses to drug addiction include treatment, rehabilitation,
and clean needle exchanges. The extensive harms experienced under the
prohibitionist model, as addressed in section I, have invigorated interest
in harms reduction approaches presented in this section.
Harms reduction has been broken down into three basic schools of
thought, largely divided by the actors behind them.108 These three groups
are: (1) the public heath approach; (2) the citizens’ rights approach; and
(3) the global justice approach. All three approaches have been effective
in addressing harms associated with drug and are therefore attractive
alternatives to the prohibitionist model.
A.

THE PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH

The public health approach grew out of medical professionals treating
drug addiction. The approach gained popularity in the face of the
terrifying HIV/AIDS epidemic of the ‘80s and ‘90s. This approach
focuses on the medical treatment of chemical addiction to drugs. Policies
provide for the exchange of dirty needles for clean needles to prevent the
spread of disease.109 The professional/public health approach is wellrepresented by recent efforts in Portugal, which was faced with an
alarming HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 1990s.

108. Tuukka Tammi, The Harm-Reduction School of Thought: Three Fractions, 31 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 381, 385 (2004). Tammi explains further that, “One can decipher some main—more
or less commonly shared—features of harm reduction, such as: value neutrality toward drug use (vs.
moralistic stance); the drug user is seen as a normal citizen full responsibilities and participation
rights (vs. seen as a deviant person or as a helpless victim; as a target for coercion); pragmatism and
scientism (vs. ideologies and beliefs); human rights and humanistic values (vs. human rights
violations in ‘the war on drugs’ and other injustices); public health priority (vs. criminality
perspective).”
109. Id. at 385-87.
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Portugal identified needle drug usage, particularly in prisons, as the
largest contributor to the HIV/AIDS epidemic it was facing.110 In 2001,
Portugal implemented the National Action Plan for the Fight Against
Drugs, which decriminalized drug use.111 This implementation does not
mean that drug consumption is legal, but the offense of drug use and
possession is no longer punishable with criminal sanctions, such as jail
time.112 Instead, Portugal has made the consumption, acquisition, and
possession of drugs for personal use and administrative offense
punishable with mandatory drug treatment.113 Individuals are permitted to
possess “acceptable” amounts of drugs without facing criminal sanction,
based on a government determination of what constitutes a “dose.”114
Trafficking illicit drugs is still a serious criminal offense and results in
severe penalties.115
Notably, Portugal’s shift to a decriminalization model has resulted in a
general improvement in both levels of drug use and addiction, and the
spread of HIV.116 Also, levels of HIV dropped drastically, because a new
emphasis on treatment programs has curbed the spread of HIV among
injection drug users, and it is believed that a decriminalized legal
environment has reduced levels of drug addiction by making treatment
more accessible.117 Additionally, decriminalization has resulted in a
110. EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION (EMCDDA), 2009
NATIONAL REPORT TO THE EMCDDA: PORTUGAL, 67 (2009), available at
www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index142806EN.html) (attributing decreases in HIV to “the
implementation of harm reduction measures, which may be leading to a decrease in intravenous drug
use … or to intravenous drug use in better sanitary conditions”).
111. Id. at 16-17 (The offender is evaluated by the national Commission for the Dissuasion of
Drug Abuse, which administers a sanction aiming to treat and rehabilitate the person using the most
appropriate interventions).
112. Id.
113. Id. There is a similar trend towards increasing treatment promotion within the prison
system of the Netherlands, which provides for addiction counseling and the possibility of serving out
portions of prison sentences in treatment centers. See EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS
AND
ADDICTION,
COUNTRY
PROFILE-THE
NETHERLANDS,
www.emcdda.europa.
eu/html.cfm/index5174EN.html#, (last accessed April, 2012) [hereinafter “Netherlands Profile”].
114. EMCDDA, Drug policy profiles—Portugal Profile, 16-17 (June 2011), available at
www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-policy-profiles/portugal (citing Law 30/2000, “When a
person is caught in possession of no more than 10 daily doses of drugs and the police have no
suspicions or evidence that supply are involved, the drug will be seized.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. EMCDDA, 2009 National Report to the EMCDDA: Portugal at 69, Graph 33 (showing
a general downward trend in HIV prevalence across both drug users and non-drug users; from 3,326
new cases in 2002 to 1,588 new cases in 2008, or a decrease of almost 53%). See also EMCDDA,
“Portugal”: New Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues, supra note 3, at
20 (observing that “Portugal remains among the countries [in Europe] with the lowest prevalence of
use for most substances, with the exception of heroin, where Portugal shows higher prevalence’s”).
117. Portugal Report to EMCDDA, supra note 109 at 67 (attributing decreases in HIV to “the
implementation of harms reduction measures, which may be leading to a decrease in intravenous
drug use … or to intravenous drug use in better sanitary conditions”). See also EMCDDA, Drug
policy profiles—Portugal Profile, supra note 113, 20 (noting that the number of newly diagnosed
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significant decrease in the use of opiate drugs.118 These results indicate a
general success of decriminalization, without the law enforcement and
incarceration expenses associated with prohibition.
The positive effects under the public heath model stand in a stark
contrast to the observable effects of the prohibition mode presented in
section I of this paper. As a result, the professional/public health model
has gained popularity in a number of domestic contexts, as well as in the
international order. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the
international body charged with implementation and monitoring of the
three main international drug control treaties. The UNODC focuses on
drug prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts among at-risk
groups. In 2009, the UNODC launched regional programs in East Asia
and the Pacific reinforcing the rule of law. The programs focused on
health-oriented drug demand reduction initiatives and HIV/AIDS
education among injecting drug users, prisoners, and other vulnerable
groups.119
The benefit of the public health harms reduction approach is its proven
ability to reduce harm. This is the evidence-based drug policy that is
commonly referred to in drug policy debates, and its support is growing.
The ability of this policy to obtain results, both in disease reduction and
addiction treatment, makes it an attractive alternative to the prohibitionist
status quo. However, merely applying the public health model still falls
short in terms of treating the larger harms of prohibition - the way that
drug users are demeaned in a punishment oriented system and in its
inability to cure the effects of drug war carnage in producer nations.
B.

THE CITIZENS’ RIGHTS APPROACH

The citizens’ rights approach is closely related to the public health
model, because it focuses on medical treatment of chemical addiction
and the use of needle exchange programs. But it differs in that its
proponents are drug users who have organized to make the use of drugs
safer and more responsible. The objective is to protect the rights of the
drug user as an individual who should not be discriminated against on the
basis of his or her drug use.120 The Netherlands is a good example of the
citizens’ rights approach, because its policy is based on the view that
drug use is not really a “crime” worthy of state intervention. Because of
HIV cases among drug users, 13.4 per million, is well above the European average, 2.85 per
million).
118. Id. at 20, 23.
119. UNODC, supra note 13, at 27-28, 66.
120. Tammi, supra note 107, at 388-90.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol19/iss1/10

22

Ford: Comparative Analysis of Drug Policy

2013]

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DRUG POLICY

219

this view, drug policy enforcement is effectuated mostly by users and
dispensaries, not police. This emphasizes the citizens’ approach because
of its tolerance towards drug use. Drug use is seen as an activity rather
than a social status, and therefore the drug user is not dehumanized.121
The Netherlands citizens’ rights approach distinguishes drugs based on a
“risk scale.”122 The risk scale amounts to a domestic rescheduling of
illegal drugs into those with unacceptable risks (opiates, cocaine,
amphetamines, and LSD) and those with tolerable risks (cannabis, and
certain tranquilizers and barbiturates).123 When this approach was
codified into law under the Dutch “Opium Act” by amendment in 1976,
unacceptably risky drugs were prohibited with criminal sanction,
whereas less risky drugs were listed in the act with no corresponding
sanction.124
Thus, the act neither legalizes “soft drugs,” nor does it offer any actual
legal protection to users or possessors of them, aside from the Dutch
government’s assertions that it will not prosecute.125 Trafficking and
selling scheduled drugs remains statutorily illegal and punishable with
imprisonment. However, cannabis is openly and popularly distributed
from commercially established “coffeeshops,” so long as they do not sell
more than five grams to any one person.126
In the U.S., advocates of harm reduction often point out that treatment
for drug offenders is preferable to incarceration, because it is both more
effective and less expensive. These advocates point to the fact that the
U.S. prison system houses more than 2.2 million people out of an
estimated population of 310.64 million or roughly 0.0073% of the U.S.127
By contrast, out of a population of 16.79 million, the Netherlands has a
prison population of only 13,749, or roughly 0.00082%.128 To place that
121. Id.
122. EMCDDA, COUNTRY PROFILE-THE NETHERLANDS, www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/
index5174EN.html# (last accessed April 2012) (“tolerable risks” results in not criminalizing drug
use or possession, and permitting the controlled sale of cannabis).
123. Id.
124. Id. (The “risk scale” evaluates risk based on medical, pharmacological, sociological, and
psychological data).
125. Id. (“Prosecution policy in drug related cases is substantially determined by the directives
issued by the Prosecutor-General”).
126. Id. (noting that the penalty for hard drug trafficking can be up to 16 years in prison, while
the tolerated sale of cannabis in coffeeshops falls outside the scope of the act).
127. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=190, (last
accessed April 2012).
128. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, THE
NETHERLANDS,
www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=157,
(last
accessed April 2013).
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in perspective, the U.S. imprisons eight times the proportion of its
citizens as does the Netherlands. In real numbers, the U.S. is housing
over 2 million more prisoners than the Netherlands. Therefore, the drug
citizens’ rights approach has a very tangible benefit in that it drastically
relieves criminal justice systems by removing the heavy burden of
criminal prosecution of an entire class of society. However,
decriminalizing drugs does little to remove problems existing in
producing nations who face massive rates of violence and corruption.
These harms are better addressed under the global justice approach.
C.

THE GLOBAL JUSTICE APPROACH

The social global justice approach shares the rights focus of the citizens’
rights approach. The global justice approach expands the dialogue of
harms-reduction in “consumer” nations to harms-reduction in “producer”
nations.129 In many ways, this approach is an offshoot of a larger critique
of the Neo-Liberal political agenda and the effects of a newly globalized
trade under international free trade agreements.130 This approach also
focuses on disparities between the Global North and South in the impact
of drugs.131 The North consumes drugs and suffers addicts while the
South produces drugs and suffers organized crime, militaristic violence,
destabilized and corrupted governments, deplorable human rights abuses,
and massive losses of human life.132 Latin America, especially over the
past few years, has embraced this line of argument—possibly because
the bulk of the blood shed in the name of prohibition has been of her
citizens on her soil. Bolivia, in particular, represents a good example of
this approach because Bolivia stood up to the world and decriminalized
the production and use of the coca leaf.
Bolivia is regarded as one of the big three coca growing regions in the
world. Bolivia grows about half the productive coca area of either
Colombia or Peru.133 What makes Bolivia’s drug policy unique is its
approach to the coca leaf, which has historically been widely regarded by
129. “Producer nations” vary depending on the type of drug discussed. For example, the UN
World Drug Report indicates that the major producer nations of cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, and
Peru, while the major opium producing nations are Afghanistan and Myanmar, and cannabis appears
to be widely produced across the globe. Likewise, consumer nations also vary depending on the
drug. However, drug consumption is generally centralized in North America and West/Central
Europe. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 91, at 19-20, 24.
130. Tammi, supra note 107, at 391-93.
131. The global North/South divide has been likened to more traditional characterizations of
“developed” and “undeveloped” nations, or the first and third worlds.
132. Tammi, supra note 107, at 393.
133. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 91, at 100 (noting that Colombia is estimated to have
30,900 hectares of coca production in 2009, as compared to Peru’s 61,200 hectares and Colombia’s
estimated 62,000 hectares in 2010).
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indigenous Bolivians as a sacred medicine and served as part of the
unifying platform for a reformer Evo Morales’ (an indigenous coca
farmer and union leader) popular election to the Bolivian Presidency in
2005.134
In 2003, under mounting pressure of unionized coca producers, Bolivia
reformed its fundamental drug law, Law 1008, to allow for limited
production of the coca leaf in its raw form.135 In 2006, President Morales
announced in a speech to the UN General Assembly his intention to
repeal Law 1008 and replace it with a law that distinguished between
coca and cocaine, allowing for the legal production and sale of the coca
leaf in a limited area called “traditional indigenous zones.”136 Oddly, and
perhaps because of strong pressure from the international community and
the United States, Morales’s policies have also employed forceful
eradication of coca in areas of illicit drug production outside of the
traditional zones, resulting in a net increase of coca eradications.137
Regardless, Morales continues to present appeals to the UN to recognize
the cultural and medicinal value of the coca leaf to the indigenous
peoples of Bolivia.138 As such, Morales has long been at the forefront of
the global harms reduction movement.
At present, Bolivia’s drug policies are not clearly defined. Morales’s
government has been attempting to reduce the amounts of coca that can
be legally produced, but has also received strong resistance from his
power base, with mass demonstrations mounting against the efforts.139
Possession, use, and trafficking of illegal drugs in Bolivia are all criminal
offenses with punishment including long jail sentences and heavy
fines.140 Bolivia’s Law 1008 does not distinguish between small-scale
drug dealers and drug traffickers, which results in very harsh penalties
for illegal drug activities, sometimes with sentences in excess of 30
134. Will Reisinger, The Unintended Revolution: U.S. Anti-Drug Policy and the Socialist
Movement in Bolivia, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 237, 248-249 & 276-280 (2009).
135. Diego Giacoman, SYSTEMS OVERLOAD - DRUG POLICY AND THE PRISON SITUATION IN
BOLIVIA 21, 2010, available at www.druglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/Systems_
Overload/TNI-Systems_Overload-bolivia-def.pdf [hereinafter “Drug policy and prison in Bolivia”].
136. Kathryn Ledebur and Coletta A. Youngers, Balancing Act: Bolivia’s Drug Control
Advances and Challenges, Washington Office on Latin America (3 May 2008), available at
www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/past/AINWOLA%20Balancing%20Act%205-23-08.pdf.
137. Id. at 1, 2.
138. Bolivia’s Evo Morales urges end to ban on coca chewing, BBC (March 12, 2012),
available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17338975.
139. Ledebur & Youngers, supra note 135, at 3.
140. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF STATE, BOLIVIA: COUNTRY SPECIFIC INFORMATION,
travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1069.html#criminal_penalties, November 2011 [hereinafter
“State Department: Bolivia”].
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years.141 Nevertheless, under President Morales, Bolivia has undertaken
one of the broadest attempts at decriminalization seen in the world.
Each of the harms reduction approaches embodies some form of
distinguishing smaller offenses of drug law from greater offenses.
However, all existing harms reduction policies are subservient to the
current prohibitionist policy because they must work within the
framework of an international prohibition imposed by the SCND, CPS,
and CAIT, and domestically under the principle of pacta sunt
servanda.142 While harms reduction models have been demonstrably
more effective in addressing harms in the drug trade, the benefits of
harms reduction cannot be maximized until a legalization and regulation
framework is adopted.
III. LEGALIZATION
The argument for legalization has existed throughout the modern
prohibition-era, but has gained a large amount of support in recent years.
After forty-two years of prohibition, it appears that many have taken note
of the ever-increasing costs of the war on drugs. Recently, leaders from
across Latin America have begun calling loudly for reforms to the
international war on drugs, ranging from decriminalization to outright
legalization.143 Uruguay attempted to legalize the possession and sale of
141. Drug Policy and prison in Bolivia, supra note 136, at 22.
142. “Pacta sunt servanda” is the principle of good faith that underlies all international
agreements and treaties. The principle is that states are bound to act as they represent they will act.
In this instance, the principle means that states who sign on to the SCND, CPS, and CAIT are bound
to act in accordance with those treaties.
143. See generally DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A PARADIGM SHIFT. LATIN AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY (2009), available at www.drogasedemocracia.org/
Arquivos/declaracao_ingles_site.pdf.
See also Ed Vulliamy, Colombia calls for global drugs taskforce, THE OBSERVER, (U.K.),
April 14, 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/15/colombia-global-drugs-taskforce (reporting
that Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos “proposed the establishment of a task force of experts,
economists and academics to analyze the realities of global drug addiction, trafficking and
profiteering, with a view to a complete overhaul of strategy.”).
See also Juan Forero, Latin American countries pursue alternatives to U.S. drug war, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 10, 2012, articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-10/world/35451300_
1_latin-american-leaders-cartels-legalization (listing Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos,
Guatemalan President Otto Perez, then-Mexican President Felipe Calderonas, former Colombian
President Cesar Gaviria, former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, and former Brazilian President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso among the Latin American leaders most forcefully offering new
proposals and critiquing U.S. drug policy).
See also Adam Williams & Flavia Krause-Jackson, Costa Rica’s Chinchilla Calls for Drug
Legalization Debate, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 1, 2012, www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-01/costarica-calls-for-debate-on-drug-legalization-amid-record-trafficking.html (reporting Costa Rican
President Laura Chinchilla saying that “[d]rug legalization in Central America merits a 'serious’
debate as a solution to the crime and violence coursing through the region even if it runs up against
U.S. opposition.”).
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marijuana outright.144 The legalization movement has even gained a
strong presence in the U.S., with 19 states legalizing marijuana for
medicinal purposes, and two states legalizing the recreational use of
marijuana, production, and sale for adults over the age of 21.145
Additionally, it appears that roughly half of Americans support the
legalization of marijuana.146
As presented in section I of this paper, the number of reasons favoring
legalization is constantly increasing. These reasons range from the tens
of thousands murdered in Mexico to the growing instability of
governments and rule of law in producer nations. Along with the
hundreds of thousands of Americans imprisoned, and the millions
arrested in the name of prohibition, the market in illegal drugs created by
prohibition generates well-organized and militant criminal organizations
with near limitless profits. The status quo of prohibition practically begs
for legalization if only to stem the violence. This section goes further by
presenting three fundamental arguments for preferring legalization to
prohibition.
First, legalization would destroy the illegal drug trade, or black market,
through economic force by introducing legal actors who would be
regulated by normal governmental agencies regulating production and

144. Johnson, supra note 8 (reporting that Uruguayan President Jose Mujica announced a plan
in June, 2012 to legalize marijuana under a state monopoly. He later tabled the bill in December,
2012 to rethink the approach.).
145. See NORML, Medical Marijuana, available at norml.org/legal/medical-marijuana-2 (Mar.
22, 2013) (listing Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, Washington, and Washington D.C. as American states and districts with medical
marijuana laws currently enacted).
See also Duke, supra note 8 (reporting that Washington’s measure I-502 and Colorado’s
Amendment 64, both measures to legalize the recreational use of marijuana in those states, had
passed by popular vote on November 7, 2012).
146. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 443 (noting that, “The United States played a leadership
role throughout much of the twentieth century in criminalizing opiates, cocaine, marijuana, and
hallucinogens, adopting such laws before most other countries and proselytizing thereafter in favor
of global prohibitions.” See also Frank Newport, Gallup, Record-High 50% of Americans Favor
Legalizing Marijuana Use, www.gallup.com/poll/150149/record-high-americans-favor-legalizingmarijuana.aspx (October 17, 2011) (showing that 50% of Americans surveyed support the
legalization of marijuana and 70% favor making it legal for medicinal use).
See also Public Policy Polling, National Survey Results, Nov. 30-Dec. 2, 2012, available at
www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/blog/MPPResults.pdf (reporting that 58% of 1,325 registered American
voters sampled thought that marijuana should be legal).
See also Princeton Survey Research Associates International, Reason-Rupe Public Opinion
Survey: January 2013 Topline Results, Jan. 31, 2013, available at reason.com/
assets/db/13627701016988.pdf (reporting that 47% of 1,000 adults interviewed in the U.S. favor
legalizing marijuana for recreational use and 53% think that the government should treat marijuana
the same as alcohol).
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commerce.147 Increased competition in a more transparent market would
both remove the high levels of profit generated by criminal activity and
would create a more ethical drug market that would be restrained from
the violence and lawlessness.148 Violence and lawlessness are implicit in
an illegal market.149 Second, it is immoral to criminalize the use and
possession of drugs because criminalization has become a systematic
destruction of human lives. The harms of an individual’s drug use, if
there are any, do not justify the social destruction of the user. Third,
legalization ends a clash between law and fact by permitting the
harmonization of the new social norm of harms reduction policies into
the domestic and international legal regime. Under the existing
prohibitionist regime, all harms reduction policies are in actuality illegal
under domestic law or violative of international treaty obligations. By
legalizing drugs, a legal shield would extend to harms reduction models,
and the benefits of such approaches could be implemented on a universal
scale. In other words, we could minimize the harms of drugs on society
by legalizing harms reduction instead of merely tolerating it.
A.

ELIMINATION OF THE BLACK MARKET BY WAY OF ECONOMIC
FORCE

At the heart of the legalization argument is the possibility of regulatory
control. While prohibition is a regulation of sorts, prohibitionist policy
limits government options for interaction with the drug market to the
decision to prosecute or to not prosecute.150 With a legalized framework,
government expands its power to influence the market at all stages.151
From production, to trafficking, to distribution, to consumption, and the
individual, the government would have the ability to tax and regulate to
exert controls on the market.152 The drug market under the prohibition
model exists wholly outside the scope of government regulation, with
actors that are criminal by definition and who do not have any incentive
to respect governmental controls.153
The illegal drug market under prohibition is a popular example in
economic textbooks. This popularity is because the black market in illicit
drugs is perhaps the truest expression of free market principles. A black
147. “Black market” refers to a market operating outside of governmental control and
regulation. Commonly, the term is understood to mean a market for illegal goods, or a market where
goods are purchased illegally.
148. Becker, supra note 45.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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market is a market that is as unbridled by government intervention as can
be imagined because no governing authority operates in a black market;
there are only buyers and sellers. Additionally, the drug market presents
a good example of several peculiarities such as inelastic demand, low
cost of production, oligopolistic supply, massive profit, and no
governmental regulation. But because the black market is free of all
regulation, there is no rule of law.154 There is no guarantee of goods for
services, or of the quality or value of goods provided.155 There is only
supply, demand, production, consumption, and protection of business
interests through any means necessary. The illicit drug market is further
compounded by massive profits.
Economists contend that legalization would squeeze illegal actors out of
the drug market by making the legal drug market more profitable.156
Thus, regulation eliminates the bulk of the illegal market’s share.
Importantly, the black market in drugs is created, and hugely empowered
by the illegal status of drugs.157 The illegal status of drugs increases the
risk associated with the product, thus inflating the price and generating
an illegal market worth an estimated $500 billion annually.158 The
inflation in the price of drugs is actually the policy purpose of
prohibition.159 The hope is that by inflating the price of drugs, less people
will want to purchase them. However, the demand for illegal drugs has
proven to be highly inelastic, meaning that the demand for drugs does
not respond to price.160 As a result, prohibition creates an ideal market for
organized crime: high profits, low costs, and few competitors.
Somewhere between an estimated $8 billion and $24 billion in cash is
smuggled into Mexico annually for illegal drugs.161 These high levels of
cash flow are not only an incredible incentive to perform criminal acts,
but they also generate massive amounts of violence in turf wars and
transactional disputes between criminal actors that cannot be settled in a
court of law.162
Legalization of drugs would economically squeeze illegal actors out of
the market by making it more cost effective to submit to government
154. Id. at 56.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 53-57.
157. Matthew S. Jenner, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic
Solution, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 901, 904-905 (2011).
158. Id. at 905.
159. See Betram & Spencer, supra note 45. Becker, supra note 45. Ross, supra note 45, at 33756.
160. Becker, supra note 45, at 53-57.
161. Jenner, supra note 156, at 905.
162. Id. at 905-906.
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regulation. Essentially, legalization removes many of the risks inherent
in the drug trade and drives the price of drugs down steeply.163 By forcing
the prices down and increasing competition, the incentives for illegal
actors to take part in the illegal drug trade are diminished, and illegal
actors are replaced with legal actors who are subject to regulation.
Opponents argue that a legal market will make drugs more accessible,
and therefore result in a sharp increase in drugs consumed. In actuality,
the demand for drugs has remained inelastic over time under a variety of
drug policies. The demand for drugs tends to remain stable regardless of
price because many people will not use drugs regardless of cost for
health and moralistic reasons, while others will always use drugs
regardless of cost due to addiction.164 This means that there would likely
be only a slight increase in demand. Additionally, legalization opens up
the possibility of a variety of regulative possibilities, such as steep excise
taxes, which could be used to keep the price of drugs high and the profits
low.165 Such an excise tax could also be understood as transforming
criminal profits into government revenues. These revenues, among other
things, could be used for treatment programs and other harms reduction
policies that have a proven record of suppressing drug demand to
manageable levels. Therefore, under legalization, the overall profitability
of drugs would decrease, government revenues would increase,
regulatory options would increase, the benefits of harms reduction
models could be amplified, and illegal actors would be replaced with law
abiding actors subject to governmental controls.
B.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF DRUG USERS IS IMMORAL

The moral argument for legalization is that it is simply wrong to punish
an individual for using a substance, because there is no direct harm to
any person other than the user. Drug use is a prime example of a
victimless crime.166 Under this argument, it is paramount to remember
that the criminal penalties and civil consequences of drug conviction are
willingly and systematically imposed on the drug law violator by the
state. As discussed in the section I, the U.S. has fallen into a position
where it now houses 23% of the global prison population.167 Over half of

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 921.
Id. at 921.
Becker, supra note 45, at 53-57.
Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 445.
WALMSLEY, supra note 64.
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those imprisoned in federal facilities are prisoners for violating
prohibitionist drug laws.168
The price paid by those prosecuted for drug offenses far exceeds mere
imprisonment or fines assigned by criminal sanction. The prospects of
that individual ever being rehabilitated into society are dashed by a
stigma that is born by criminal prosecution or conviction. Employers
have the right to examine an applicant’s criminal background, as do
landlords and schools. Further, federal aid to that person is cut off. Since
the prohibition model was launched in 1970, there have been over 20
million Americans arrested for mere possession of marijuana, and
therefore who are ineligible for student loans, housing assistance
programs, and many other benefits enjoyed by most citizens.169 When
examined in consideration of legalization, it cannot be ignored that these
prosecutions are avoidable in the sense that drug prohibition was, and is,
a conscious choice made by society. Even if drug use is seen as a
punishable offense, the price paid by those prosecuted is widely
disproportionate to the harms of the “crime.”
The morality of the issue becomes even more relevant considering what
the harms of the crime are. At heart, we must ask why we are prosecuting
individuals for drug use at all. The preamble to SCND, in announcing the
international war on drugs, states that the purpose is to combat the
problem of drug addiction, “a serious evil for the individual…fraught
with social and economic danger to mankind.”170 So the harm that we are
seeking to combat by criminalizing drug use is the addiction to drugs.
However, as all of the harm reduction models indicate, it is both more
effective and efficient to combat this evil without criminal sanctions.
Further, as demonstrated by the carnage wrecked upon people in Latin
America in the name of a prohibitionist model, the harms associated with
prohibition far outweigh the moralistic purpose of the prohibitionist
model. Therefore, the only moral choice is to step away from prohibition.
However, recent events in the Netherlands and the U.S. indicate that
solely adopting a harms reduction approach is not enough. Prohibition
has been written into law both internationally and domestically in every
harms reduction nation. Harms reduction, therefore, is dependent on the

168. Drug Threat Assessment, supra note 52, at 5 (citing data from the United States Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
169. Duke, supra note 62, at 86.
170. Preamble to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, as Amended by 1972
Protocol, (SCND).
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willful lack of enforcement of the law by whoever is in power at the
time. The costs of this dependency are explored below.
C.

LEGALIZATION HARMONIZES THE HARMS REDUCTION APPROACH
WITH EXISTING LAW

Besides the ability to prevent mass death, human rights atrocities, and the
social destruction generated by prohibitionist policies, the legalization of
drugs would resolve the clash between the laws of prohibition and the
realities of harms reduction approaches. The reality that harms reduction
policies are in fact pursued internationally and domestically contradicts
the existence of prohibitionist law, creating a clash between fact and law.
This clash is readily apparent when comparing the national harms
reduction policies of the Netherlands, Portugal, and Bolivia to the
international obligations of prohibition imposed under the SCND, CPS,
and CAIT. However, the effect of this clash on the rule of law is better
expressed in the U.S., where state laws embracing harms reduction
approaches and the use of federally scheduled and prohibited substances
results in arbitrary enforcement of the law and legal uncertainty.
Despite a federal prohibition of drugs in the U.S., many states have
loosened their drug laws to decrease criminal sentences and enforcement.
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have passed medical
marijuana laws, which aim to permit the use of a federally prohibited
drug in the medical treatment of patients.171 Since California passed the
first medical marijuana law in 1996, the number of states duplicating
such laws has grown steadily. There are an additional eleven states with
legislation currently under consideration to legalize medical marijuana.172
Similar to state efforts to legalize medical marijuana, state efforts to
legalize the recreational use of marijuana are also rapidly gaining
momentum. In 2010, California attempted to pass a law legalizing the
171. See NORML, supra note 144 (listing Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Washington D.C. as American states and
districts with medical marijuana laws currently enacted).
172. See also Tim Dickinson, The Next Seven States to Legalize Pot: Why Oregon, California
and more are likely to follow Colorado and Washington toward legalization, ROLLING STONE, Dec.
18,
2012,
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-next-seven-states-to-legalize-pot-20121218
(listing Oregon, California, Nevada, Rhode Island, Maine, Alaska, and Vermont as states likely to
pass laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use).
See also Medical Marijuana, 11 States with Pending Legislation to Legalize Medical
Marijuana, ProCon.org, available at medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resource
ID=002481 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (listing Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, and West Virginia as American states considering
medical marijuana legislation).
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possession and use of marijuana under state law, but narrowly failed.173
Two states have gone so far as to legalize the recreational use of
marijuana, and as many as seven other states are considering similar
legislation.174
While these hard fought legislative efforts represent the evolution of drug
policy in the U.S. and perhaps even herald the eventual demise of
prohibition, these states' laws remain in conflict with established and preemptive federal law. The production, transportation, possession, and sale
of federally scheduled substances is criminally prohibited by the CSA,
and the federal government still uses a scheme of mandatory sentences to
guarantee the imprisonment of offenders.175 However, what the federal
government does with the enforcement of the federal law in relation to
the states has proven to be inconsistent at best.
Generally, the federal government in the U.S. has chosen not to interfere
with state medical marijuana laws. Recently, the U.S. Attorney General
even went so far as to issue what is popularly called the Ogden Memo, a
memo to all U.S. Attorneys instructing them that state law regarding
medical marijuana is to be respected.176 However, the Obama
administration has drastically changed the course of federal enforcement
on facilities operating within the precepts of state law. Contrary to the
Ogden Memo, U.S. Attorneys issued letters to state governments
threatening prosecution of state officials participating in the regulation of
medical marijuana dispensaries.177 In 2012, the U.S. DEA and Internal
173. See, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, Proposition 19: Legalize Marijuana in
CA, Regulate and Tax (Jan. 5, 2011) available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010general/maps/prop-19.htm (showing the final count on Proposition 19 to be 46.5% in favor and
53.5% opposed).
174. See Duke, supra note 8 (reporting that Washington’s measure I-502 and Colorado’s
Amendment 64, both measures to legalize the recreational use of marijuana in those states, had
passed by popular vote on November 7, 2012).
See also Johnson, supra note 8 (reporting that Uruguayan President Jose Mujica
announced a plan in June, 2012 to legalize marijuana under a state monopoly. He later tabled the bill
in December, 2012 to rethink the approach.).
See also Tim Dickinson, The Next Seven States to Legalize Pot: Why Oregon, California
and more are likely to follow Colorado and Washington toward legalization, ROLLING STONE, Dec.
18,
2012,
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-next-seven-states-to-legalize-pot-20121218
(listing Oregon, California, Nevada, Rhode Island, Maine, Alaska, and Vermont as states likely to
pass laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use).
175. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801; Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, Oct. 12,
1984, 98 Stat. 1976; and Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), Pub.L. 99-570, Oct. 27, 1986, 100
Stat. 3207.
176. David W. Ogden, Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys, (Oct. 19th, 2009),
available at blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192.
177. See David Klepper, RI lawmakers to take up marijuana dispensary rules, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 27, 2012, www.boston.com/news/local/rhode_island/articles/2012/03/27/ri_lawmakers_to_
take_up_marijuana_dispensary_rules/.
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Revenue Service recently raided Oaksterdam University and the home of
its proprietor, Richard Lee.178 Richard Lee was a pioneer in developing
the medical marijuana system in California and an advocate for
legalization of marijuana but decided to surrender all of his businesses
out of fear of federal prosecution.179 Richard Lee and Oaksterdam
University serve as examples of the legal risk implicit in a flawed system
that yields a clash between fact and law. Oaksterdam University was
similarly situated to many of the coffee shops in the Netherlands in that
its business is technically prohibited by national law but permitted by
local law. With the recent advent of legalized marijuana for recreational
use in two states, it remains unclear how the federal government will
respond.
Legitimate businesses will not take part in the drug trade under the
current prohibitionist regime, because they are under threat of
prosecution by a national government. Illegal actors, however, will
participate in the drug trade regardless of the legality of the market.
Legalization, however, would encourage legitimate businesses to
participate in the drug market. A policy encouraging legitimate
businesses is best understood as a harms reduction approach to drug
policy. Legitimate businesses willingly submit to regulation and can be
monitored and controlled more easily. They do not perpetuate violence,
and they sell a product that can be subjected to governmental controls of
quality and taxation. Illegal actors are not subject to any of these controls
and have no incentive to comply with government regulations at all.
If efforts to address the harms imposed by the international prohibition of
drugs are ever to be realized, it is clear that some form of legal protection
from prosecution is necessary. On the international level, there is no
enforcement mechanism equivalent to the U.S. federal government over
state governments, but there are other means by which the global norm
of prohibition is enforced. Specifically, member States can exert
significant pressure on each other to comply with international law, to
get back in line with the herd. We can see this at practice with the
pressures the U.S. exerts over its neighbors to the South, both financially
and politically, with efforts like Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative.
The need for legalization on all levels of government, domestic and
international, is essential to ever effectively combat the problems with
drugs.
178. John Hoeffel, Oakland Activist to turn over marijuana businesses after raid, L.A. TIMES
(April
6,
2012),
available
at
www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-oaksterdam-divest20120406,0,7901222.story.
179. Id.
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CONCLUSION
[H]arm reduction is too limited to meet the political problems
that discrimination-based drug policy creates for us. Maybe we
have to move to a different philosophical position and say that
some of the harms that are created by our discriminatory drug
policies can no longer be accepted…The intolerable damage
inflicted on third world drug producers [is] merely the side
effects of trying to keep illicit drugs out of the United States of
the European Union; this damage is simply not acceptable. We
have to develop ideas about harm refusal. Human rights are of
course the philosophical background against which we can
judge those harms and I think that is what we should apply.
Harm reduction is relevant for certain social conditions and for
certain political contexts…In some areas of drug politics we
have to move from harm reduction to harm refusal.
-Peter Cohen-180
Prohibition has failed as a policy to reduce drug use. The failure has been
recognized by leaders across the globe for years. The international
community and many domestic governments have expressed and
committed to principles of harms reduction that have proven to be more
effective and efficient than the current prohibitionist model. However,
without the legal protections and policy options available under a
legalization model, harms reduction will always be at risk to prosecution
under prohibitionist laws. Given the profitability of the illegal drug
market, it is unlikely that the black market in illegal drugs will ever be
contained, let alone eliminated. It is high time that the world realize that
there is a moral obligation to end prohibition.

180. Tammi, supra note 107, at 393 (quoting a speech delivered by Peter Cohen at the World
Social Forum 2003).
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